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Wise: The Gardeners of Vimy

The Gardeners of Vi~ny
Canadian Corps' Farming Operations
during the German Offensives of 1918
S.F. Wise
"'T"he Gardeners of Salonika" was Georges
.l Clemenceau's jibe at the French and
British divisions tied down in entrenchments
round the Greek port for a good part of the First
World War, because all they seemed to do was
dig, rather than launch a Balkan offensive. 1 The
Canadian Corps, from Field Marshal Haig's
perspective, was similarly removed from the war
when Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie,
strongly supported by the Canadian government,
refused to accept the piecemeal breakup of the
Corps to help shore up the British line during
the great German offensive which began in March
1918. Haignever forgave this rebuff, and his diary
is studded with unfavourable comparisons of the
Canadians with the Australians, who permitted
their divisions to be detached from the corps
organization and shifted to menaced sectors of
the Western Front.
As a result of Currie's action, which Lord
Derby, the British Secretary of War, forced Haig
to accept three of the four divisions which made
up the national army were restored to Canadian
command, occupying the Vimy bastion and lines
extending from it northward. The Corps had last
fought in a major operation in October /November
191 7, at Passchendaele; it was not to be
employed again (except for small operations
incidental to holding a substantial portion of the
front) until the climactic battle of Amiens in
August 1918. In the interim, while the Allies
fought with their backs to the wall to stem the
great series of German onslaughts, the
Canadians, secure in the immensely strong lines
they had created around Vimy, were given
opportunity to rest and to train for the moment
when they would be used to spearhead a renewal
of the Allied offensive against the German army. 2

The Canadians held a vital and extensive part
of the Allied line, and were obviously performing
a major defensive function during the long weeks
of the German offensive, even though their
relative inaction occasioned much British
resentment. In that sense they bear little
resemblance to the Gardeners of Salonika. In
another, however, they were the genuine article,
and can legitimately be termed "The Gardeners
of Vimy," for during the spring and summer of
1918, as well as guarding the Vimy lines, the
Canadian Corps was also involved in battle zone
farming in a big way. How did the Corps come to
be engaged in an essentially peaceful and bucolic
enterprise, especially during such a critical
period?
This activity was completely unknown to me,
until a few references in the enormous finding
aid to Record Group 9 in the National Archives
of Canada piqued my curiosity. The Canadian
Corps, as a large fighting formation of over
100,000 men, required many non-fighting units
and sub-units to support it in the field, supply
it, provide it with reinforcements, medical
services, legal and police services, and so on. All
its parts generated masses of paper, and much
of this is deposited in Record Group 9. Among
this immense volume of documents is to be found
a memorandum of early 1918 entitled "Suggested
Establishment for Agricultural Employment
Coy.," signed by Major F. C. Washington, who is
identified as "Canadian Corps Agricultural
Officer." Why did the Corps need an Agricultural
Officer and an Agricultural Employment
Company? The story that emerges from
fragmentary evidence is incomplete, yet while
hardly of cosmic significance, is an unusual and
interesting one.
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Two Canadian soldiers helping French peasants at farm work.

Washington's memo does not answer either
question, because it is simply a set of
administrative recommendations that wound up
on the desk of the Corps Commander. It provides
for an establishment of five officers- himself at
the Corps level and one for each of the Canadian
divisions in the field - a French interpreter, a
Company Sergeant-Major and a Quartermaster
Sergeant, 8 Sergeants, 8 Corporals, 8 Lance
Corporals, a shoeing smith Corporal and 5
shoeing smiths who were privates, and 325 other
ranks, including 5 cooks and a stenographer! A
one-ton truck, 36 heavy draft horses and 18
general service wagons completed the
establishment. The whole, Washington thought,
"should be sufficient to do all agricultural work
required in this area, as soon as seeding has been
completed. ":1
Sir Arthur Currie supported Washington's
recommendations in a letter to the administrative
branch of British First Army, the formation to
which the Canadian Corps belonged for most of
1918. He pointed out that the Corps "has been
providing a considerable number of personnel
for agricultural work," some to help French
farmers in the Corps area, about 60 men
"employed under the French Agricultural Officer
at Arras," and 150 men needed "for Corps and

Divisional Farms which supply food for Corps
requirements. The total acreage to be placed
under cultivation for this purpose is 1400, of
which much will be cultivated for vegetables."
Currie, as we shall see, had no problem with
members of the Corps engaging in farm work.
He did not believe, however, that this should be
at the expense of battalions or batteries in the
line, and proposed instead that an Agricultural
Company, as laid out in Washington's draft,
should be approved as a permanent farming unit,
and its members should be replaced in their
original units by reinforcements from the training
establishment in Britain. 4
Currie's readiness to engage in farming on
the Western Front, though it may have been
helped by his having grown up on a farm near
Strathroy, Ontario, was in fact in conformity with
policy laid down by the British government, which
instructed GHQ to carry it out. As announced by
Brigadier-General Lord Radnor. GHQ's Director
of Agricultural Production, the policy was
intended to address the "impending world
shortage of food for human consumption." The
British government had decided that "the English
Armies undertake the growing of certain
foodstuffs in the way of green vegetables and
potatoes ... on the lands on which they now find
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Two views of
Canadian cavalry
ploughing and

harrowing ground
where potatoes are to
be planted.

~

themselves," and in addition do what they can to
help "the French Agriculturalists and those of our
other Allies." It was also hoped that the pressure
on shipping, already great because of losses to
German submarines, would be reduced
somewhat. Lord Radnor's announcement set
scales for vegetable production, authorized the

use of farming implements from derelict French
and Belgian villages, ordered the appointment
of agricultural officers for armies, corps,
divisions and areas, laid down the chain of
command within this structure, and outlined the
manner in which any surplus beyond the needs
of units and formations would be dealt with. 5
41
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What exactly did Radnor mean by directing
that the British Armies, and by extension its
Canadian, Australian and New Zealand
components, were to grow vegetables "on the
lands on which they now find themselves"? Major
Washington clarified this for the Canadian Corps,
pointing out that it was "not intended that ground
which will be cultivated in the regular way by the
French Population be used for this purpose." All
lands farmed by the Corps would be in the Corps
Area, adjacent to camps, training grounds, and
other such establishments, and all ofthem not
simply within sound of the guns but in the area
immediately behind the Corps' defensive trench
system. This included land which had been
fought over and won by the Corps and long
deserted by the French, some of it cratered or
disfigured by fieldworks, battery positions and
other surviving marks of the military uses to
which it had been put by Germans and Allies. 6
The 1 ,400 acres mentioned by General Currie
was therefore not a single block of land, but
scattered, in bits and pieces like the small
holdings of a medieval village, behind the
divisional areas and in the vicinity of battery
positions. In early February the quartermaster
branch of the Canadian Corps undertook an
initial survey to discover how much land had
been taken up by the formations and units of the
Corps for farming, and found that progress varied
considerably. "While some divisions have made
very little progress, one Division has undertaken
the cultivation of 300 acres. In addition to this,
the Corps Agricultural Officer has two Corps
Vegetable Farms, at Marqueffles and Berthonval,
totalling nearly 200 acres." The leading division
was undoubtedly the Fourth (General Watson),
which in addition to a divisional vegetable garden
of 125 acres boasted the 100-acre farm of one of
its infantry brigades, then in reserve at Servins,
and a large number of smaller plots. For example,
each of its field artillery batteries had 2-acre
gardens, and so did each of its field companies
of engineers, while the divisional Machine Gun
Battalion was farming 10 acres, and such units
as the Signal Company, the Field Ambulance, and
Divisional H.Q. itself were each cultivating 2
acres. 7
As befitted a military organization, the
instructions and planning for the farming
operation were elaborate. We may take as an
example the instructions issued by the First

Canadian Infantry Brigade, the premier brigade
of the First Canadian Division, regarded by
contemporaries and by many since as one of the
finest divisions in the whole of the British Army
on the Western Front. The First Division got a
late start in the farming business, but got itself
organized in March to catch up. Thus First
Brigade Headquarters assured its infantry
battalions and associated units that there was
"plenty of ground for gardening in the forward
area." If more land was required, the Agricultural
Officer would rent it from the owners. Units were
instructed that "small plots should be dug -large
plots ploughed," to a depth of five or six inches.
Do not, soldier farmers were told, "bring raw
chalk to the surface." Lots of manure was readily
available, since abandoned French farmhouses
were distinguished by the presence of
mountainous piles of rotting manure just outside
the kitchen door; 20 to 30 loads of it should be
applied per acre. It was to be thoroughly worked
into the soil by cultivators or harrows, or by rakes
and hoes in the smaller plots. 8
Not only were specific instructions for
preparing the soil issued to the gardeners of the
Corps, but inspecting eyes were watching to see
that the job was well done. Major B.W. Browne,
the Deputy Assistant Adjutant General (DAAG ),
First Division, warned the Divisional Agricultural
Officer in mid-March that "it has been noticed
that some units are wasting quite a lot of good
ground because of a few shell holes, and patches
are left presumably on account of having a bit of
couch grass or heavier growth than the remainder
of the ground; further, headlands 9 are not marked
out as they should be before commencement and
consequently each individual ploughman begins
and finishes where he feels disposed." The
Agricultural Officer, therefore, was instructed to
reprove units tolerating such discreditable
practices, letting them know that it "requires no
more labour to do the work in an orderly,
workmanlike and proper manner than in a
slipshod and careless way." Farm work, it was
made clear, must be performed in a soldierly and
uniform fashion. Browne's findings were
disputed by Captain G.F. Dudley, Transport
Officer of 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, who
claimed that "the sector being cultivated by 2nd
Can. Inf. Bde. is being farmed in an ordered
manner, as near to 'home' conditions as is
possible. Shell holes are filled in, couch-grass
burned off before plowing, headlands marked
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A postcard oJ the Agricultural School at Berthonval. Berthonval was the site of one of the two extensive farms
oJ the Canadian Corps HQ. Most likely the Canadians were farming lands formerly cultivated by the School.

and straight." A month later Major Browne was
back to the attack, seemingly giving good
agricultural practice priority over the war. "It is
reported," he wrote to units, "that unnecessary
damage has been done to young crops during
the digging of trenches in the cultivated areas.
The attention of O's C. working parties should
be drawn to this, and instructed to see that no
such damage .. .is committed by men under their
charge." 10
Browne had been entrusted with
responsibility for expediting First Division's
farming program while still a captain, and knew
he had the backing of the division's commander,
Major-General Archibald (Batty Mac) Macdonell,
and its former commander, General Currie.
Because the Division had some catching up to
do, he wrote to all units a memorandum marked
URGENT:
Instructions have been received from the
Canadian Corps that this Division must have
200 acres at least under cultivation for vegetable
growing. A return has to be sent to the Corps
within the next few days, giving map location,
and a sketch of the ground selected by Units for
this purpose.
Divisional Headquarters has approximately 100
acres to plough. and it will therefore be necessary
for the other units in the Division to make up

the 100 acres which are still required to be put
under cultivation .... It is not desired to have this
Division behind others in the Canadian Corps,
so that what is required, is the united eiiorts
throughout the whole Division to make this
vegetable growing a success. Time is very limited
and the need most pressing. 11

Volunteers were not lacking. Even before Browne
had circulated the Division, Lieutenant-Colonel
D.M. Ormand, the officer commanding the lOth
Canadian Infantry Battalion, had written to 2nd
Brigade Headquarters that "this unit would be
very pleased to commence a garden at once. Any
area to WEST of ST. POL would be favoured."
Ormond offered to farm l 0 acres "if assurances
could be given" that members of the unit assigned
to the farm, together with unit transport, would
not be moved. Obviously no such assurance was
possible; instead, the lOthjoined with the other
infantry battalions in the 2nd Brigade, the 5th,
7th and 8th, to create the 2nd Brigade farm. By
early March the Brigade commander had visited
the site of the farm, and pronounced himself"very
pleased with the progress that has been made.
He regards this work as of great importance." It
rather looks as if the lOth Battalion was still the
most enthusiastic participant; it informed the
Brigade transport officer that the battalion
intended to put 50 acres of the Brigade Farm
into potatoes, and since they needed l 0 bushels
43
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of seed potatoes an acre, or 500 bushels, they
re4tureu rranspon. t:Senma tne corps lines was
a light railway (or tramway) system, originally
developed to bring ammunition and other
supplies up as close to the fighting front as
possible. The 1Oth Battalion, and presumably
other units, appropriated the tramway to take
delivery of its seed potatoes; they would like them
delivered. noted the transport officer, "to
ALOUETTE Siding, near AIX-NOULETTE
Station on Light Railway." 12
But the Brigade Farm was undoubtedly a
collective enterprise. An officer from the 1Oth
Battalion was farm superintendent, but he had
the assistance of eight soldiers from the 5th, 7th
and 8th Battalions, as well as teams and men
from all Brigade units and a cook from Brigade
Headquarters. During the ploughing and planting
season, "Work will be carried on at the Farm
during all daylight hours, working two shifts."
Second Brigade's progress mirrored that of the
whole Division: by early May Major Browne was
satisfied that farming in the First Division was a
going concern, including the Divisional
Headquarters Farm itself. "Please advise all
concerned," he wrote with evident satisfaction,
"that the Divisional Headquarters land for
fanning takes in everything WEST of the road
running NORTH and SOUTH on the EAST side
of the Cemetery to the Slag heaps at FOSSE 6,"
the Farm thus being in the vicinity of Lens. 13
Once the land had been ploughed and
cultivated, and readied for seeding, the most
minute instructions were issued for each of the
several vegetables on the authorized list (and
therefore seeds were freely available from
Radnor's organization). Some of the vegetables
had to be started early and then transplanted. It
was therefore necessary for each Divisional Farm
to have a Nursery for seedlings of cabbages, kale,
savoy cabbages. and leeks. The military farmers
were instructed that an ounce of cabbage seed
would produce a thousand plants, which should
then be transplanted in June in rows 18 inches
apart. ''The plants are dibbled with a stick in a
hole made in the ground and the plant inserted,
the earth being afterwards pressed around the
roots firmly." Precisely two feet should separate
each plant in the row. Instructions for the other
transplants were similar; and in all cases,
reference was made to late varieties which could
be harvested in the spring of 1919. (No one, high

or low, believed at this juncture that the war
would end in 1918, and so another season of
gardening was anticipated.)
The instructions are remarkable only for
their detail. "The great secret of success" with
beets was "to keep the weeds down." Thinning
was the sovereign method for producing plentiful
healthy carrots; the same was true for turnips
and swedes. Potatoes, however, needed special
treatment, especially after harvesting. when they
should be "put in a damp pit, well dried by a
trench and covered with earth and ventilated by
means of a pipe on ground level and through the
top by a wisp of Straw." Whether this mysterious
advice derived from Canadian practice. or from
English farming, is not clear, but it is does not
seem likely that such methods are still
employed. 14
Major Washington, the Corps Agricultural
Officer, was convinced that if Corps farmers
followed the advice he had circulated, a bountiful
harvest could be expected. When one considers
that the population from which the Corps was
drawn was still, in the majority, rural (though
not overwhelmingly so, as it had been in the late
nineteenth century), there must have been many,
even in among the more urbanized officer class,
who smiled and shook their heads over his
optimism. Washington was confident enough of
the prospects of agriculture behind the trench
lines to circulate a table containing his
projections for the harvest. Table I is a faithful,
if slightly more orderly, version of it. If one acre
of shell-torn ground, properly cultivated, would
yield 25,860 pounds of vegetables, not to speak
of potatoes, an important separate category for
Major Washington, it is little wonder that his
enthusiasm knew no bounds. 15
It looks very much as if most formations
and units responded to the gardening scheme
with some degree of real enthusiasm, but the
same could not be said for the Canadian
reaction to another initiative from Lord
Radnor's organization. This was the "Piggeries"
plan, announced by Radnor in a policy
document issued through Haig's Headquarters.
"In order to save shipping, and to give the men
a change of diet," he wrote, "it is considered
that Pig Farms on a large scale should be
established in Army and Line of
Communication Areas." A central fund,
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Table I

%of Area

Number of Plants or
Amount of Seed
needed to plant Area

Probable Yield in
Pounds

1. Cabbage

30% - 48 poles

3,500 plants

10,000 lbs.

2. Kale

20% - 32 poles

2,250 plants

6,750 lbs.

3. Savoy

10%- 16 poles

1 ,600 plants

2,500 lbs.

4. Leeks

5%-8 poles

3,000 plants

1,250 lbs.

5. Beets

5%-8 poles

5 oz. seed

1,000 lbs.

6. Carrots

15%- 24 poles

12 oz. seed

1,000 lbs.

7. Turnips

10%- 16 poles

5 oz. seed

2,240 lbs.

8. Swedes

5%-8 poles

2 1/2 oz. seed

1.120 lbs.

Vegetable

Totals

150 poles == 4840 yards == 1 acre

administered by Radnor, would advance to
Armies the money to buy piglets, but military
pig farmers were warned that "no issues of goods
or forage in kind will be made from Army stocks,
nor will purchases of these be made from money
advanced. The feeding of the pigs will be entirely
from the swill produced by units." 16 In
excruciating detail, instructions were sent out
advising on the correct method of constructing
sties (they should face south. and have sloping
floors; brick or stone buildings were best,
because pigs prefer to be cool.) Swill should be
heated occasionally, to give piglets a dietary fillip.
Large numbers of military swineherds were not
required: "it is considered that three men should
be sufficient to tend and feed 150 pigs."
Slaughtering was to take place under the
superintendence of the Army Service Corps and
the Veterinary Corps.
At least in the Canadian Corps, piggeries were
not pushed by authority with the same vigour as
vegetables, a tribute to common sense. BrigadierGeneral J.M. Ross of the 5th Canadian Infantry
Brigade thought that brigades were not the right
formations to manage pig farms, because of their
frequent moves. Such disruptive changes would
"defeat the project. the success of which depends
upon the suitable housing and careful feeding of
the animals." The CRA of 2nd Division told
Division HQ that "this formation has no
proposals to submit, please," while the 4th
Canadian Infantry Brigade observed that in the
trench lines "there is no refuse or swill available,
and it would be difficult to produce food for young
pigs in this uncultivated district." Perhaps, 6th
Brigade suggested helpfully, raising pigs was
something Division Headquarters staff might take
on?

25,860 lbs

When, in July, the Quartermaster General
of the British Army directed that "all large
centralised pig farms already in existence will
be abolished, and the keeping the piggeries on
a small scale will be left in future to individual
enterprises on the part of Units," no dissent
was heard from the Canadian Corps, and it is
probable that pigs never took wing there. 17
Did the Canadians maintain their
gardening project throughout the spring and
summer of 1918, despite the German attacks?
To what degree was their garden project
unusual? If they were able to maintain it, how
successful was it? Unfortunately, it is not
possible to give a complete answer to any of
these questions, but what evidence there is
permits some conclusions.
In the first place, the Canadian Corps was
by no means alone in its front-line farming.
Since First British Army, of which it was a part
until late July, was also relatively exempt from
German attack during the spring and summer,
other formations within it also engaged in
farming. On the other hand, it seems most
unlikely that Fifth British Army, which bore
the brunt of the initial German attack on 21
March, was permitted the necessary period of
consolidation, and the same holds for Third
British Army, its neighbour. 18 The operational
records of the Australian Corps, which I have
examined for the May-August 1918 period
(when elements of this Corps were with both
Second and Fourth British Armies), are silent
on the subject, and since Australian divisions
were in action for most of the period of the
German offensive, it would appear that farming
was out for them. It is quite possible, however,
45
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that other elements of Second Army in Flanders
did some farming, as would rear echelon British
units. It should be noted that agricultural
activities were by no means unusual to the rear
of German divisions, since the bulk of the
German Army on the Western Front had been
on the defensive from the early days of the war,
and its divisions, once in position, tended to
stay put. It has been remarked that "the
German system of allocating divisions to a
sector of front was a far more permanent one
than that of the Allies. Once posted to a sector,
a German division stayed there to attack,
defend, or hold trenches for as long as
possible. ''~ As a result, German divisions
exploited the French countryside for foodstuffs,
including operating their own farms. 20
9

On 2 7 March 2nd Canadian Division was
ordered to the Third Army front; it was not to
return to the Canadian Corps until l July. What
became of its gardening operations? The 2nd
Division area was taken over by the 2nd
(Lowland) Division; did this mean that the
Scottish formation took over its gardens as well?
Second Division's Agricultural Officer was
Lieutenant R.E. Ferguson; on 8 May he was told
by his divisional DAAG that "It is proposed to
retain possession of the Farm throughout the
season, and you will please note that you are not
to vacate or give up the property without definite
instructions being received from these
Headquarters. Kindly keep this Office advised of
progress which is being made." This seems
explicit enough, but to make doubly sure that
the Scots did not interfere with the divisional
farm, Second Division HQ approached the 2nd
Division, and received assurance from its
commanding officer that "I have no objection to
your Divisional Agricultural Officer and farm
personnel carrying on operations at the Divisional
Farm." Presumably, when during the first week
of May the First, Third and Fourth Canadian
Divisions were pulled out of the line to begin a
long period of intensive training in infantry-tank
collaboration and open warfare that was to
continue until July, each division adopted a
similar expedient, and continued to farm its
acreage with "farm personnel" of the division. 21
In fact, we know that this was so, because of an
order issued by Brigadier-General G.J. Farmar,
the BGGS "A" of the Canadian Corps, on 25 July
1918, virtually on the eve of the Battle of
Amiens, and sent to all divisions:

In order to ensure that all crops in the
Canadian Corps Area are harvested as soon
as they are ready. Area Commanders are
authorized to call on units in their area to
supply whatever assistance in the way of men
and horses required by the Fanners. The Corps
Commander is extremely desirous that
everything possible should be done by units in
this Corps to ensure that no waste of crops
occurs through lack of labour to harvest, and
this assistance should be given whenever the
exigencies of the service permit.n

How successful was the farming operation?
On 21 August, just as the Canadian Corps was
leaving the Amiens sector for a new theatre, First
Army held a Conference on Agriculture at its
Headquarters, at which the Canadian Corps was
represented. The Army Agricultural Officer
announced that in the Army Area, 3,600 tons of
potatoes had been produced, and were now
available for distribution. The minutes betray the
existence of some friction over the mode of
distribution; "it was realised that some Divisions
and Units might feel dissatisfied at the potatoes
grown on a farm worked by them being issued
broadcast," but this was a labour-saving solution
which would "work most simply and smoothly
from the supply point of view." One can imagine
the scarcely suppressed grumbling on the part
of diligent farmers like the Canadians at this piece
of authoritarian legerdemain; in any environment
other than the military there would have been
bitter argument. On the other hand, First Army
was not impolitic enough to attempt to impose
the same kind of mechanism upon the vegetable
farmers, whose produce would become available
"in large quantities" by the beginning of
September. The meeting concluded with planning
for the 1919 crop year, and the warning that
"manure on lands rented for horse standings and
in rented stables belong to the British
Government .. .In future it was to be dumped on
the vegetable farms where possible," instead of
being allowed to fall into the hands of grasping
French peasants. 23
Unfortunately these minutes disclose nothing
about the productivity of Canadian Corps farming
operations, and there does not seem to be any
documentation giving such information. Nor
(with one exception) is there any account of
farming at the unit level in any of the battalion or
other units histories of the CEF. The exception
is Lieutenant-Colonel H.M. Urquhart's history
of the 16th Battalion, a unit of the 3rd Infantry
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Brigade of the 1st Canadian Division. The 16th
farmed 105 acres near Bully Grenay. with
seeds and young plants provided by "Q"
Branch. Farming staff were chiefly men with
low medical categories (most of them B2) drawn
from non-fighting units in the divisional area,
plus teams and drivers from battalion transport
and field artillery batteries. The 16th Battalion's
farmers scrounged old plows and harrows they
found on the battlefield, and rented some from
French farmers. The harvested crop was
testimony to the farming skills of the unit,
exceeding Major Washington's estimates in
every respect- 278 tons of potatoes, 22 tons of
turnips, 79 tons of cabbages, 8 tons of carrots
and 3 tons of beets - an unheralded triumph
which may well have been matched by many
other Canadian units during their long respite
from active military operations. 24

11.
12.
13.

14.

15.
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17.
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